Abstract-Multishot network coding is considered in a worstcase adversarial setting in which an omniscient adversary with unbounded computational resources may inject erroneous packets in up to t links, erase up to ρ packets, and wire-tap up to μ links, all throughout shots of a (random) linearly-coded network. Assuming no knowledge of the underlying linear network code (in particular, the network topology and underlying linear code may change with time), a coding scheme achieving zero-error communication and perfect secrecy is obtained based on linearized Reed-Solomon codes. The scheme achieves the maximum possible secret message size of n −2t−ρ−μ packets, where n is the number of outgoing links at the source, for any packet length m ≥ n (largest possible range), with only the restriction that < q (size of the base field). By lifting this construction, coding schemes for non-coherent communication are obtained with information rates close to optimal for practical instances. A Welch-Berlekamp sum-rank decoding algorithm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes is provided, having quadratic complexity in the total length n = n , and which can be adapted to handle not only errors, but also erasures, wire-tap observations and non-coherent communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear network coding [1] - [3] permits maximum information flow from a source to several sinks simultaneously in one shot (multicast). Moreover, for sufficiently large field sizes, the maximum information flow can be achieved with high probability by a random choice of coding coefficients at each node, without knowledge of the network topology [4] .
Correction of link errors was considered in [5] - [10] , and secrecy against link wire-tapping was studied in [11] - [15] . Some of these works assume probabilistic error correction, and some require knowledge or modification of the linear network code for the outer code construction. Errorcorrecting codes under an adversarial model without such requirements were first given in [16] , [17] for non-coherent communication (in which the sink has no knowledge of the coding coefficients of the incoming links), and in [18] for coherent communication. Coding schemes that provide perfect secrecy and zero-error communication and which are compatible with random linear network coding were first given in [19] . The coherent-case construction in that work (similarly in [16] - [18] ) is based on Gabidulin codes [20] , [21] and achieves the maximum secret message size of n − 2t − ρ − μ packets, where n is the number of outgoing links at the source, and for t (link) errors, ρ erasures and μ wire-tapped links. Moreover, the packet length is only restricted to m ≥ n , which is the maximum possible range.
All of the works noted above make use of only one shot of the linearly-coded network. Correction of link errors in multishot network coding (see Fig. 1 ) was first investigated in [22] , [23] . As noted in these works, the -shot case can be treated as a 1-shot case with number of outgoing links at the source n = n . This approach again yields the maximum message size of n −2t−ρ packets, but would require packet lengths m ≥ n = n instead of m ≥ n . Such packet lengths may be impractically large and would require operations over a field of size Q , if Q is the field size of the 1-shot Gabidulin code (see also Fig. 1 ). To circumvent these issues, the authors of [22] , [23] provide a multilevel construction that improves on trivial concatenations of 1-shot Gabidulin codes.
Later, convolutional rank-metric codes were studied in [24] - [28] , and a concatenation of an outer Hamming-metric convolutional code with an inner rank-metric block code was given in [29] . See [30] for a survey. Convolutional techniques yield codes achieving the streaming capacity for the burst rank loss networks described in [27] , where recovery of a given packet is required before a certain delay. However, they do not achieve the upper bound of n − 2t − ρ packets on the message size for a given number of shots . The closest known constructions in terms of message size [26] , [27] require in general exponentially larger field sizes.
To the best of our knowledge, schemes that achieve perfect secrecy without knowledge of the underlying network code as in [19] have not yet been investigated in the multishot case.
In this work, we provide a family of coding schemes for coherent communication with maximum secret message size of n − 2t − ρ − μ packets, whose packet length is only restricted to m ≥ n (maximum possible range) in contrast to m ≥ n , providing a considerable field-size reduction compared to using -shot Gabidulin codes (see Fig. 1 ). The number of shots is however restricted to < q, where q is the size of the base field in the linear network code. By lifting our construction, we adapt it to non-coherent communication with nearly optimal information rates for practical instances.
Our coding schemes are based on linearized Reed-Solomon S   T1   T2   a2   b2   a2   b2   a2   b2   a2   a2   a2   S   T1   T2   a3   b3   a3   b3   a3   b3 a3 + b3 a3 + b3 a3 + b3 codes, introduced in [31] and closely connected to skew Reed-Solomon codes [32] . Linearized Reed-Solomon codes are maximum sum-rank distance (MSRD) codes. They are natural hybrids between Reed-Solomon codes [33] , [34] and Gabidulin codes [20] , [21] , [35] , in the same way that the sum-rank metric is a hybrid between the Hamming and rank metrics, and adversarial multishot network coding is a hybrid between adversarial network coding and adversarial discrete memoryless channels (e.g., wire-tap channel of type II [36] or secret sharing [37] ). Indeed, rank-metric and Hammingmetric codes are the two particular cases of sum-rank-metric codes that correspond to = 1 and n = 1, respectively. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate zero-error communication and perfect secrecy in adversarial multishot network coding. In Section III, we give sufficient and necessary conditions for coding schemes to correct a given number of errors and erasures, and for perfect secrecy under a given number of wiretapped links. In Section IV, we provide the above-mentioned constructions based on linearized Reed-Solomon codes [31] . Finally, we give in Section V a Welch-Berlekamp sum-rank decoding algorithm for linearized Reed-Solomon codes that includes the classical one [38] and its rank-metric version [39] . The algorithm has complexity of O(n 2 ) = O(( n ) 2 ) multiplications in the same field as the 1-shot Gabidulin code. For brevity, all proofs are omitted. They can be found in [40] .
Notation and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we will fix a prime power q and positive integers m, , n = n 1 + n 2 + · · · + n , and N = N 1 + N 2 + · · ·+ N . We will denote by F q m and F q the finite fields with q m and q elements, respectively. Fix an ordered basis A = {α 1 
where In this section, we will formulate reliability and security in multishot network coding under a worst-case adversarial model. Our analysis naturally extends that in [19] to the multishot case (see also [16] - [18] ).
We will consider shots of a network where random linear network coding over the finite field F q is implemented [4] , where we have no knowledge of the network topology and no control over the encoding coefficients. The network topology may change with time, the encoding coefficients at each node are independent for different shots, and we assume no delays. The packets sent in each shot through the links of the network and linearly combined at each node are vectors in F m q . We assume that an adversary is able to inject error packets in up to t links, modify transfer matrices to erase up to ρ encoded packets, and wire-tap up to μ links, all distributed over the shots of the network as the adversary wishes (see Fig. 1 ). Other than these restrictions, the adversary is assumed to be omniscient and have unlimited computational power.
For i = 1, 2, . . . , , assume that the ith shot has as input a matrix X i ∈ F m×ni q , and assume that the adversary introduces t i ≥ 0 errors and ρ i ≥ 0 erasures, and wiretaps μ i ≥ 0 links in that shot. Following the model in [19, Sec. III] , the output to the receiver is a matrix 
Assume that the sent codeword is X ∈ X. With the previous restrictions on the adversary, in the case of coherent communication with transfer matrices
the output of the -shot network is restricted to the subset
In the case of non-coherent communication, the output is instead restricted to the subset
Finally, the output to the adversary is restricted to the subset
In this work, we will consider coding schemes as follows.
Definition 1 (Coding schemes). Let S be the set of secret messages and let S ∈ S be a random variable in S. A coding scheme is a randomized function F : S −→ X . For unique decoding, we assume that X S ∩ X T = ∅ if S, T ∈ S and S = T , where
for S ∈ S. We define the support scheme of F as the collection of disjoint sets P(F ) = {X S } S∈S .
As in [19] , we will require zero-error communication and perfect secrecy. We adapt the definitions from [19] as follows. 
or equivalently I(S; W ) = 0, for all W ∈ X∈XS W X (μ) and all S ∈ S. We conclude by recalling how to construct coding schemes using nested linear code pairs. The idea goes back to [36] for the wire-tap channel of type II.
Definition 3 (Nested coset coding schemes). Given nested linear codes
, we define its corresponding coding scheme F : S −→ X as follows. Choose a vector space V such that C 1 = C 2 ⊕ V, where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of vector spaces, and a vector space isomorphism
III. MEASURES OF RELIABILITY AND SECURITY
In this section, we will extend the studies in [18] , [19] regarding what parameter of a coding scheme gives a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be t-error and ρ-erasurecorrecting, or secure under μ observations.
A. The Sum-rank Metric and Coherent Communication
We start by defining the sum-rank metric in F n q m , which was introduced in [23] . It was implicitly considered earlier in the space-time coding literature (see [41, Sec. III] ).
We define the sum-rank weight of c as
Finally, we define the sum-rank metric
Next we define minimum sum-rank distances of supports of coding schemes.
Definition 5 (Minimum sum-rank distance). Given a coding scheme F : S −→ X , we define its minimum sum-rank distance as that of its support scheme (see Definition 1):
When F is constructed from nested linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q m , its minimum sum-rank distance is the relative minimum sum-rank distance of the codes:
The minimum sum-rank distance of a single linear code
We now give a sufficient and necessary condition for coding schemes to be t-error and ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent communication. The sufficient part has already been proven in [23, Th. 1] for a deterministic code. 
B. The Sum-subspace Distance and Non-coherent Communication
We start by connecting codewords in F n q m to elements in the Cartesian product P(F m q ) , which were first considered for multishot network coding in [22, Subsec. II-B].
For a coding scheme F : S −→ X, we define its sum-subspace support scheme as Col S (P(F )) = {Col S (X S )} S∈S , where
As in the single shot case [16] , the number of packets injected in the ith shot by a codeword c, with Col S (c) = U ∈ P(F m q ) , coincides with dim(U i ). If all codewords inject the same number of packets in a given shot, we may say that the coding scheme is sum-constant-dimension. For such coding schemes, we will consider the sum-subspace distance, introduced in [22, Eq. (2)].
Definition 7 (Sum-subspace distance [22] ). Given U , V ∈ P(F m q ) , we define their sum-subspace distance as
For a coding scheme F : S −→ X , we define its minimum sum-subspace distance, denoted by d SS (Col S (P(F ))), analogously to their minimum sum-rank distance.
The sufficient part of the following result was proven in [23, Th. 1] for a deterministic code. 
C. Measuring Security Resistance Against a Wire-tapper
In this subsection, we give a sufficient and necessary condition for coding schemes built from nested linear code pairs to be secure under a given number of observations. Assume that F (S) is the uniform random variable in X S given S ∈ S. Given an integer μ ≥ 0, the coset coding scheme is secure under μ observations if
The reversed implication also holds if S is the uniform random variable in S.

IV. CODING SCHEMES BASED ON LINEARIZED REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section, we will introduce a family of coding schemes whose secret message size is the maximum possible for coherent communication. By a process analogous to lifting [17, Subsec. IV-A], we will also provide coding schemes with nearly optimal information rate for non-coherent communication among sum-constant-dimension codes.
A. Linearized Reed-Solomon Codes and their Duals
Throughout this subsection, we assume that 1 ≤ ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ n i ≤ m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , . Therefore n ≤ (q−1)m.
Let σ : F q m −→ F q m be the field automorphism given by σ(a) = a q r , for all a ∈ F q m , where 1 ≤ r ≤ m and gcd(r, m) = 1 (i.e., F σ q m = F q ). We may set for simplicity r = 1, but we need to consider the general case to include later dual codes. We define linear operators as in [31, Def. 20] .
Definition 8 (Linear operators [31]). Fix a ∈ F q m , and define its ith norm as
for all b ∈ F q m , and all i ∈ N. Define also
We also need the concept of conjugacy in F q m , which was given in [42] This defines an equivalence relation on F q m , and thus a partition of F q m into conjugacy classes. Take now a primitive element γ of F q m , and observe that D γ i−1 , for i = 1, 2, . . . , . For k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n, we define the corresponding linearized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k as the linear code C 
where
. . .
By [31, Prop. 33] , this code is isomorphic as a vector space to a k-dimensional skew Reed-Solomon code [32, Def. 7] . In particular, it is also k-dimensional and the generator matrix in (3) has full rank. Moreover, linearized Reed-Solomon codes are maximum sum-rank distance codes, which was proven in [31] 
Proposition 1 ([31]). For a linear code
C ⊆ F n q m of dimension k, it holds that d SR (C) ≤ n − k + 1.
Moreover, equality holds for C = C σ L,k (B, γ) as in Definition 10. That is, linearized Reed-Solomon codes are maximum sum-rank distance (MSRD) codes.
Observe that Gabidulin codes [20] , [21] , [35] are obtained as particular cases by choosing = 1 (thus n = n 1 ): In that case, we have that
One can also recover Reed-Solomon codes [33] and generalized Reed-Solomon codes [34] by setting σ = Id or m = 1 (thus n 1 = n 2 = . . . = n = 1): In that case, we have that
for i = 1, 2, . . . , and j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. This explains the discussion in Section I. We now show that the duals of these codes are again linearized Reed-Solomon codes, thus also maximum sumrank distance, which was not proven in [31] . This result extends [34, Th. 1] , [20, Th. 7] and [35, Th. 2] . We will need it to obtain optimal secure coding schemes in view of Theorem 3.
) is as in Definition 10, then there exist linearly independent sets
⊥ is also an MSRD code.
B. Optimal Coding Schemes for Coherent Communication
We first extend the upper bound on the entropy of the secret message from [19, Th. 12 ] to the multishot case.
Theorem 5. Let t ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0 and μ ≥ 0 be integers such that 2t + ρ + μ < n.
For given random distributions (not necessarily uniform), if the coding scheme F : S −→ X is terror and ρ-erasure-correcting for coherent communication, and secure under μ observations, then it holds that
where entropy is taken with logarithms with base q m .
We may now claim the optimality of coding schemes built from nested pairs of linearized Reed-Solomon codes: 
Hence the coding scheme is optimal according to Theorem 5.
C. Nearly Optimal Coding schemes for Non-coherent Communication
In this subsection, we adapt the lifting construction from [17, Def. 3 ] to linearized Reed-Solomon codes. In contrast with the coherent case, the information rate of such construction is no longer optimal. However, we will show that it is close to optimal in reasonable scenarios in practice, as shown in [17, Sec. IV] (see also [19, Sec. VII] ). Since lifting will only add packet headers that contain no information about the secret message, we will restrict ourselves to sum-constantdimension codes. These are simply subsets of
where M = (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M ), and P(F Mi q , n i ) is the family of vector subspaces of F Mi q of dimension n i , for i = 1, 2, . . . , . In view of Subsection III-B, we will consider the following parameters of sum-constant-dimension codes.
For integers 0 ≤ N ≤ M , recall that the q-ary Gaussian coefficients are given by
The following sum-subspace Singleton bound is a refinement of that in [22, Subsec. VI-B], where a single puncturing removes a whole factor P(
where the minimum is taken over numbers 0
We now recall the extension of the lifting procedure from [17, Def. 3] to the multishot scenario, which was first considered in [23, Subsec. III-D]. In the rest of the subsection, we will assume that M i = n i + m, for i = 1, 2, . . . , .
Definition 12 (Lifting [23]). We define the lifting map I
. . , , we define
For a block code C ⊆ F n q m , we define its lifting as the sumconstant-dimension code I S (C) ⊆ P(F M q , n). Using Theorem 7, we may claim the near optimality of lifted linearized Reed-Solomon codes as in [17, Prop. 5] . 
It holds that
.
If we inject at least one packet of information per shot, then /k ≤ 1, and the previous upper bound is simply 2/(m log 2 (q)), which is essentially that in [17, Prop. 5] , and is independent of the number of shots.
V. A WELCH-BERLEKAMP SUM-RANK DECODING ALGORITHM FOR LINEARIZED REED-SOLOMON CODES
In this section, we show how to adapt Loidreau's version [39] of the Welch-Berlekamp decoding algorithm [38] to a sum-rank decoding algorithm with quadratic complexity over F q m for linearized Reed-Solomon codes (Definition 10).
Our algorithm, as presented here, implicitly translates the sum-rank metric and linearized Reed-Solomon codes into the skew metric [31, Def. 9] and skew Reed-Solomon codes [32, Def. 7] , respectively. Full details on why the algorithm works and has complexity O(n 2 ) over F q m are given in [40] . A skew-metric decoding algorithm for skew ReedSolomon codes was also recently given in [44] . However, this algorithm has cubic complexity and does not handle erasures.
A. Error-Correcting Algorithm with Quadratic Complexity
Assume that the received word is y = c + e ∈ F 
for all a ∈ F q m . This ring was introduced with more generality in [45] . It is non-commutative and both a left and right Euclidean domain. Arithmetic evaluations based on Euclidean division were introduced in [42] , [43] as follows.
Definition 13 (Evaluation [42] , [43] ). Given F ∈ F q m [x; σ], we define its evaluation in a ∈ F q m as the unique F (a) ∈ F q m such that there exists G ∈ F q m [x; σ] with
We precompute sets B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } and R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } from the linearly independent sets B (i) = {β
. . , , and the primitive element γ ∈ F * q m (see Subsection IV-A). We set
where b
The algorithm will require computing recursively certain sequence of skew polynomials. Using the notation a c = σ(c)c −1 a for a, c ∈ F q m and c = 0, we construct skew
for i = 1, 2, . . . , j and j = k, k + 1, . . . , n, and where
If we have constructed the jth skew polynomials, we define
Next we define
For the initial steps, we precompute the unique The actual algorithm is as follows, where the inputs are and (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ) ∈ F n q m . 1) Initialization and Newton interpolation:
• Compute s j and s j as in (8) .
and Q j+1 as in (9) and (10).
3) Euclidean division:
• Set L = L n and Q = Q n .
• Compute F such that Q = LF by Euclidean division. 4) Return the coefficients of F : (F 0 , F 1 
, and A i ∈ F (ni−ρi)×ni q has full rank, for i = 1, 2, . . . , . Next compute
ni }, and define
ni−ρi }, for i = 1, 2, . . . , . It follows that the sets A i are linearly independent over F q . Furthermore, by the linearity over F q of the operators in Definition 8, we have that
for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , . Thus cA T corresponds to the evaluation codeword in the linearized
Moreover, the number of sum-rank errors is at most
, and n − ρ is the length of the new code. In conclusion, to recover the message we only need to compute A to find the new code C σ L,k (A, γ), and then run the algorithm in Subsection V-A.
We now show how to include wire-tapper observations. Consider a nested coset coding scheme, as in Definition 3, using linearized Reed-Solomon codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q m . If k 1 = dim(C 1 ) and k 2 = dim(C 2 ), we may choose W in Definition 3 as the vector space generated by the last k 1 − k 2 rows of the generator matrix of C 1 given as in (3) .
The encoding is as follows. The message is x 2 ∈ F k1−k2 q m . We generate uniformly at random x 1 ∈ F k2 q m , and we encode x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ F k1 q m using the generator matrix of C 1 in (3) to obtain the codeword c ∈ F n q m . Finally, the numbers of errors t and erasures ρ are constrained by 2t + ρ ≤ n − k 1 , by Theorem 6. Thus, we may apply the decoding algorithm in Subsection V-A to the larger code C 1 and we recover x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ F k1 q m . Thus we recover the message plus the random keys, which we may simply discard.
We conclude by adapting the algorithm to non-coherent communication. We assume that μ = 0 for simplicity. Let C ⊆ F n q m be a linearized Reed-Solomon code of dimension k. Assume that we transmit the codeword c = (c (1) , c (2) , . . . , c ( ) ) ∈ C using the lifting process as in Definition 12. This means that the receiver obtains
where Rk(E i ) ≤ t i , and A i ∈ F Ni×ni q , for i = 1, 2, . . . , . So now the receiver knows A = diag ( A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A ) instead of A, and we may compute the linearized Reed-Solomon code C = C A T as in the beginning of this section. If 2t+ρ < n − k, we may prove following the lines in [47, Sec. 4.4 ] that a minimum sum-subspace distance decoder gives the same output as a minimum sum-rank distance decoder for c = c A T ∈ C = C A T . Hence we can find a solution using the algorithm in Subsection V-A for C .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed the use of linearized Reed-Solomon codes for reliability and security in multishot random linear network coding under a worst-case adversarial model. We have shown that the corresponding coding schemes achieve the maximum secret message size in the coherent case, and close to maximum information rate in the non-coherent case. Decoding can be performed iteratively and with overall quadratic complexity. Their advantage with respect to simply using Gabidulin codes is that the field size is not exponentiated to , and the packet length is only restricted to m ≥ n , in contrast to m ≥ n , where n is the number of outgoing links at the source and is the number of shots.
